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Abstract 
This paper analyzes what determines ownership structure of family firms in Korea. Our analysis 
shows that control is as important a factor as performance in the determination of whether a 
family in Korea chooses to own a firm. The controlling family prefers to own shares of de facto 
holding companies because they provide control over affiliated companies and firms that 
perform well. The family, however, allows its affiliated companies to own more shares of firms 
that perform poorly and of firms that do not provide the family with power to control the firm. In 
addition, controlling families own fewer shares of firms that make bond investments in affiliated 
companies because bond holding does not provide control. We carry out logit regressions for 
firms without family ownership and for firms with a positive family ownership. The family 
chooses not to own shares regardless of a firm’s performance if the firm does not provide 
significant control over affiliated companies. We also show that the family values its control 
more for closely held firms. 
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Determinants of Family Ownership: 
The Choice between Control and Performance 
 
 
Family ownership is a common form of ownership the world over. Numerous studies have 
documented family ownership in different economies, and they show that family ownership is not 
confined to privately held firms; it is also dominant among publicly traded firms. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and 
Lang (2002), and Faccio and Lang (2002), among others, provide evidence about family ownership 
around the world. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) study large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, 
and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of the 
firms are widely held. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang 
(2002) study firms in East Asian countries, and they also find that family ownership is dominant in all 
countries except Japan. These studies also report that controlling families have power over firms 
significantly in excess of their cashflow rights; they hold this power through pyramid structures and 
cross-holdings among affiliated companies. 
 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2002) report that, among eight East Asian countries, Korea has the 
second-highest family-concentrated ownership after Indonesia. They report that, when they apply a 
10% cutoff of family ownership as they classify firms into family firms, 67.9% of Korean firms are 
family owned.
1  Firms without an identifiable controlling family are rather rare in Korea. In our study, 
which forms the basis for this article, only 10.7% of Korean firms are without a controlling family.
2 
Most firms in Korea are under family control even if the controlling family owns only a fraction of the 
shares, a fraction that is far less than 10%. It is often the case, particularly among large chaebol 
affiliated companies, that the controlling family does not own a single share, but the family still 
maintains its controlling power via pyramidal or circuitous ownerships among affiliated companies 
that are under its control. 
 
Notable examples of family control with only a small fraction of family ownership, or even without 
any family ownership, can be found in the Samsung group. It is the largest chaebol group in Korea 
and comprises 63 affiliated companies, all under the control of the Lee family. The ownership share of 
the Lee family varies widely across the affiliated companies. The family owns shares in only 19 out of   3
the 63 companies; it does not own any shares in the remaining 44 companies. For those companies 
whose shares they do not own, the family secures its control through its ownership of affiliated 
companies. 
 
Figure 1 shows the equity holding structure among 63 Samsung-affiliated companies. In Figure 1, 
companies denoted with a bold box are the companies in which the Lee family owns shares. Samsung 
Electronics, the largest company in Korea, provides a good example that illustrates how the family 
secures its controlling power with only a fraction of the company’s shares. The Lee family owns 
3.32% of Samsung Electronics, an amount that is not large enough to secure management control. The 
Lee family, however, owns 54.41% of Samsung Everland, which owns 19.34% of Samsung Life 
Insurance. Samsung Life Insurance in turn owns 7.08% of Samsung Electronics.
3 Through this 
particular pyramid, the Lee family secures 7.08% of the voting rights in Samsung Electronics. Two 
other types of pyramids provide the Lee family with another 5.18% of its voting rights. 
 
These three overlapping pyramidal structures together provide the Lee family 12.26% of voting rights 
of Samsung Electronics,
4  which, when combined with the Lee family’s outright ownership of 3.32%, 
amounts to a total of 15.58% ownership of Samsung Electronics. This is sufficient to provide the Lee 





It is common among Korean chaebol companies that the controlling family does not own a single 
share of the firms that are under its control. As of April 2004, 312 companies belong to Korea’s top 10 
chaebol groups, but the controlling families own shares in only 116 firms (37.2%). For the remaining 
196 firms (62.8%), the families do not own any shares, and their controlling power is secured entirely 
by affiliated companies’ ownership. Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) describe such an 
ownership structure as a controlling-minority structure, in which a shareholder exercises control as it 
retains only a small fraction of the equity claims on a company’s cashflow. Bebchuk, Kraakman, and 
Triantis point out that such a controlling-minority structure is possible through dual-class share 
structures, stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties. In Korea, both common shares and preferred 
shares are issued. Preferred shares do not carry voting rights and all common shares carry the same 
single vote—shares carrying multiple voting rights are not allowed in Korea—and the Fair Trade Act 
prohibits cross-share ownership. Therefore the ownership family’s control is secured entirely via a 
pyramidal and/or circuitous structure among affiliated companies.   4
 
Constraints on the family’s ability to invest (in other words, the fact that the controlling family does 
not possess unlimited funds) gives rise to a pyramidal and/or circuitous ownership structure such as 
the one presented in Figure 1. If the family cannot afford to own shares of every company in which it 
wants to maintain a control, it must decide which company to own. For those it decides to own, the 
family also must decide how many shares it wants to own. Given that ultimate management control 
stays within the family, it is the family that decides which firms it owns and which firms it lets 
affiliated companies own. This raises the interesting question of how the family decides what to own 
and what not to own. For those companies in which the family chooses to own shares, the question 
also arises of how many shares to buy. 
 
It is the purpose of this paper to investigate what makes the controlling Korean family own shares of 
some companies on its own while it lets affiliated companies own shares of other companies. This 
paper will also explore the question of what makes the family and the affiliated company own more or 
fewer shares among these companies. 
 
Existing literature analyzes the relationship between family ownership and firm performance. These 
studies do not, however, include another important factor that determines the family’s ownership. In 
family firms, the family would value its control as much as it would value the firm’s performance, if 
not more. Its controlling power is the reason why the family constructs a pyramidal ownership 
structure. Another issue that existing analyses do not consider is the to-own-or-not-to-own decision 
made by the family. These studies omit analyses of firms whose shares are not owned by the family 
but are under family control by means of shares owned by affiliated companies. In other words, the 
existing literature does not analyze why the family decides not to own shares even if the company is 
under the family’s control and thereby is part of the pyramid. 
 
Numerous studies (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), and Lemmon and Lins (2003)) document a significant statistical relationship 
between firm performance and inside ownership. These studies show that firms with higher degrees of 
controlling family ownership perform well because the family’s interest is more vested in such firms. 
Such analyses are based on the agency problem raised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that argues that 
conflicts of interest between inside shareholders and outside investors have implications for the firm’s 
valuation.  
   5
Another set of studies analyzes the causal relationship between inside ownership and corporate 
performance. Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) raised the issue of endogeneity of 
ownership structure, and many studies (Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2003), Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke 
(2003), Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005)) followed to show that corporate value affects 
ownership structure. Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) shows that when 
controlling for endogeneity, the causality runs from firm performance to managerial ownership, not 
vice versa. Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) show that even when controlling for endogeneity, 
managerial ownership and corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. Such reversed causality 
from firm performance to ownership makes more sense in family firms in which the controlling family 
makes the final decisions, including how to structure the ownership. In family firms, the controlling 
family that has inside information may decide to own more shares of firms that are performing well 
while the family avoids owning shares of firms that are performing poorly. If the family still wants to 
maintain control of poorly performing firms, it allows affiliated companies to own shares of such 
firms.  
 
Dispersed ownership and separation of control from ownership are observed in the United States, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom. Family ownership is a more common form of ownership in other 
parts of the world, including most emerging-market countries as well as in industrialized Western 
European countries. In literature that analyzes those markets with dispersed ownership, inside 
ownership usually refers to shares owned by professional management, not by a family. Therefore, 
research results on inside ownership in countries with dispersed ownership cannot be directly 
extended to emerging-market countries where inside ownership consists of shares owned by a family 
and its affiliated companies, not by professional management. 
 
Literature has documented family ownership in various economies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), Morck, Stangeland, 
and Yeung (2000)) and shows that family ownership is not confined to privately held firms; family 
ownership is also dominant among publicly traded firms. In East Asian emerging-market countries, a 
substantial number of firms are owned and managed by controlling families. Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (2000) investigate the separation of ownership and control in publicly traded firms in nine East 
Asian countries, and they find that voting rights frequently exceed cashflow rights via pyramid 
structures and cross-shareholding. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) also find that firm value 
increases with the cashflow ownership of the largest shareholder, but it falls when the control rights of   6
the largest shareholder exceed its cashflow ownership. Using sample from five East Asian countries, 
Mitton (2002) also shows that better stock price performance is associated with firms that have less 
inside ownership. Lemmon and Lins (2003) analyzed firms in eight East Asian countries during the 
region’s financial crisis and found that the crisis-period stock returns of firms in which managers have 
high levels of control but have separated their control and cashflow ownership were 10 to 20 
percentage points lower than stock returns of other firms. This empirical evidence demonstrates a 
significant relationship between controlling-family ownership and firm valuation. 
 
Several studies analyze the relationship between controlling-shareholder ownership and firm 
performance in Korea. Joh (2003), using 5,829 Korean firms during 1993–1997, found that firms with 
a high disparity between controlling-shareholder’s control rights and cashflow rights showed low 
profitability and, as such, the negative effects of the control-ownership disparity were stronger in 
publicly traded firms than in privately held ones. Baek, Kang, and Park (2004) analyzed Korean firms 
during the 1997 financial crisis and found that chaebol firms with concentrated ownership by 
controlling-family shareholders experienced a larger drop in the value of their equity than did firms 
with less concentrated ownership. Firms in which controlling-shareholders’ voting rights exceeded 
cashflow rights also had lower returns. Chang (2003) analyzed a sample of chaebol affiliated Korean 
public firms for the 1986–1996 period and showed that performance determined ownership structure, 
but not vice versa, and provided evidence that controlling shareholders use insider information to 
increase their shares of more profitable firms and transfer profits to other affiliates through related-
party transactions with affiliated companies. 
 
The literature seems to agree that performance is one key factor that determines family ownership. 
Existing studies, however, do not explore another key determinant of family ownership: the power to 
control. We hypothesize that the family is as much interested in its controlling power as it is in firm 
performance. Firm performance is important, but the family may forgo performance for the sake of 
securing control if benefits from control exceed cash rewards from good performance. If the family 
must choose between performance and control, it will choose control over performance in many 
emerging-market countries where the monetary and nonmonetary benefits of control far exceed cash 
rewards from good performance. Whether the family values its controlling power as much as its 
monetary rewards—either in cash dividends or in capital gains—from the firm’s performance is what 
this paper sets out to analyze. 
   7
Literature has documented the existence of private benefits of control (Barclay and Holderness (1989), 
Zingales (1994, 1995) Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2004)) In particular, Nenova (2003) and 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that higher private benefits of control are associated with less 
developed capital market, less protected minority shareholders, and more concentrated ownership. 
Other things being equal, we would observe more of private benefits of control in family firms in 
which an ownership is concentrated.   
 
Numerous studies (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000), Bae, Kang and Kim 
(2002), Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002)) provide evidences of various forms of private 
benefits that the controlling shareholder enjoys. Private benefits are not limited to use of a company’s 
money to pay for perquisites. Controlling family has various ways to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) use the term “tunneling” to 
describe the transfer of resources out of firms for the benefit of controlling shareholders. Tunneling 
can take a variety of forms, such as transfer of assets to the controlling family at an unfair transfer 
price, debt guarantee, excessive executive compensation, dilutive share issues, and inside trading, etc. 
 
Within a given pyramidal ownership structure, the company that is positioned at the top of the 
pyramid provides the most control over the other companies. The company at the bottom of the 
pyramid does not possess any control. Other things being equal, the family owners would prefer to 
hold more shares of the company that is positioned at the top of the pyramid and fewer shares of the 
company that is positioned at the bottom of the pyramid. If the power to control is a key consideration 
to the family when it decides how many shares of a certain company to own, the family may even 
avoid owning shares of a highly performing company if it is positioned at the bottom of the pyramid. 
The family would allow the affiliated companies to own shares of firms that are positioned at the 
bottom of the pyramid. 
 
If a holding company is established, the family will obviously want to own substantial shares of the 
holding company that provides the family with controlling power. The family would allow the holding 
company to own other son-type and grandson-type companies. In only a few cases, however, are 
holding companies established in emerging markets.
6 There are firms, however, that are not holding 
companies but that own a substantial proportion of shares of other affiliated companies. These firms 
are de facto holding companies that provide the family owners with control. A de facto holding 
company has its own business, and it is often the case that its business is not related to the firms whose 
shares it owns. Therefore, the shares it owns are for the purpose of controlling the firm, not for a   8
business purpose. We refer to such a de facto holding company as an “operating holding company” as 
opposed to a “pure holding company” whose sole business is holding shares of other companies.
7 
 
Within a pyramidal structure, operating holding companies are positioned at the top half of the 
pyramid and companies whose shares are owned by the operating holding companies are positioned at 
the lower half. The key issue this paper explores is whether the family values its controlling power as 
much as it values company performance. Other things being equal, including firm performance, we 




I. Data and Samples 
 
A. Sample Selection 
 
We analyze nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange as of December 31 of each year for 
the 1998–2001 period. To maintain consistency of ownership data that is constructed as of the end of 
each calendar year, we restrict our sample to firms whose fiscal year ends on December 31. We 
exclude firms that have negative equity book value from our sample because such firms have 
accumulated losses over the years and their performance measures and financial data are not reliable. 
We also exclude from our sample firms with missing financial data. There were 624 nonfinancial 
listed firms on the Korea Stock Exchange in 2001. The application of the three selection criteria stated 
above leaves 466 firms for 2001. For the entire sample period of 1999–2001, 1,538 firms are in our 
sample. 
 
B. Family Firms 
 
We identify for each firm a controlling shareholder who is related to the founding family regardless of 
the number of shares the controlling shareholder owns. Founding family members often control the 
firm even when they do not own any shares, as illustrated in the discussion of pyramidal structure in 
the previous section. A family member is determined by both blood and marriage. If there is no 
founding family, we identify an individual shareholder and those family members who own a 
substantial fraction of outstanding shares and have effective control of the firm. If a firm fits into the 
above categories, we classify it as a family firm. Firms with management that owns some fraction of 
the firm’s shares but does not have ultimate control are not identified as family firms. This screening   9
filter may underestimate family ownership because anyone who is not identifiable as having a family 
link is not included in family ownership. Firms with no controlling family are excluded from our 
sample because our analysis focuses on what determines family ownership. 
 
In 2001, there were in Korea 50 firms out of 466 firms identified as not having a controlling family. 
For the entire sample period of 1998–2001, there were 130 out of 1,822 firms that did not have a 
controlling family. These are mostly firms whose controlling shareholder is a financial institution or 
the government and firms that are undergoing restructuring under the creditor bank’s control or under 





The final sample selection filter is the existence of affiliated companies. If a firm does not have an 
affiliated company and stands alone as a business entity, all controlling power should be secured by 
family ownership. In other words, if a company has no affiliated company that provides the family a 
controlling power, the family in control of such a firm does not have the same incentive as the family 
that controls a number of companies and has an opportunity to secure control via pyramidal or 
circuitous ownership among affiliated companies. It is surprising that only a few firms do not have 
affiliated companies. For example, only 42 firms out of 416 family firms did not have affiliated 
companies in 2001. For the entire sample period, 165 firms out of 1,703 did not have affiliated 
companies. These firms are excluded from our sample. For the entire sample period of 1998–2001, 
1,538 sample firms have both a controlling family and affiliated companies. 
 
We analyze the ownership of all publicly traded family firms for the period after the financial crisis in 
1997. There are advantages to focusing on the period after the crisis because a number of firms went 
through restructuring, and the ownership structure also changed as a consequence.
9 As presented in 
Table II, ownership has not been stable over the sample period. From 1998 to 1999, average family 
ownership decreased by 1.5 percent point, but it increased by 1.6 percent point in 2000. It further 
increased by 1.0 percent point in 2001. Such changes in family ownership allow us to examine 
unambiguously the effect of the firm valuation on the ownership structure. 
 
[Table II] 
   10
One potential consequence of the restructuring process in Korea is that the family is given an 
opportunity to change its ownership; it may choose to own more shares of highly performing firms 
while lets affiliated companies own shares of poorly performing firms. On the other hand, not enough 
time has passed since the changes of ownership of firms, and the new ownerships may not yet have a 
significant effect on the performance of their firms. This will make the causality run from performance 




Ownership data are provided by the Korea Stock Exchange. The data are constructed by the stock 
exchange from reports of ownership changes that listed companies submit to the exchange every 
year.
10 All ownership data are calculated as a proportion of the total number of outstanding common 
shares as of the end of each sample year. 
 
Data about firm characteristics, including financial data, were secured from the Korea Information 
Service (KIS) 2000 database. Related-party-transaction data, such as equity and bond investments in 
other affiliated companies, are collected manually from footnotes in the companies’ annual auditors’ 
reports. Stock-price data were provided by the Korea Securities Research Institute (KSRI) database. 
 
II. Ownership Structure of Family Firms 
 
There are four types of insiders in a family-controlled firm that has affiliated companies: the 
controlling family, affiliated companies, nonprofit affiliated foundations, and management that is not 
related to the family. Furthermore, ownership of a family firm can be classified into four categories, 
depending on the type of insiders. Table III presents descriptive statistics on the ownership structure of 
family firms in Korea. Inside ownership is the sum of these four types of ownership, and it accounts 
for 35.2% of outstanding shares. Out of these four categories of inside ownership, family ownership 
and affiliated-company ownership are the two major means of securing controlling power. Family 
ownership, which is often referred as the cashflow right, accounts for 20.7% of the outstanding 
number of shares on average. Affiliated-company ownership accounts for 12.6%. Family ownership 
and affiliated-company ownership together are 33.3% on average and comprise 96.5% of control 
rights. Shares owned by nonprofit affiliated foundations and shares owned by nonfamily management 
account for only a small fraction; both ownerships together are 1.8%. 
   11
[Table III] 
 
There is a significant negative correlation between family ownership and affiliated-company 
ownership. The correlation coefficient is 0.533, and it is significant at the 1% level of significance.
11 
The negative correlation implies that there is a substitution between these two types of ownership. It 
implies that there are constraints on the family’s ability to invest as well as on the affiliated company 
so that the family utilizes its limited wealth as well as affiliated companies’ wealth in securing control 
over the many affiliated companies under its control. One possible constraint on the affiliated 
company is a Korea Fair Trade Act regulation that restricts the amount of equity investment a 
company can make into affiliated companies.
12 
 
Table IV presents the distribution of ownerships by type. Both family ownership and affiliated-
company ownership are most frequent in the range of 0-10%; the second most frequent range is 20%-
30%. Inside ownership, defined as the sum of four types of ownership, is most frequent in the range of 




III. Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Explanatory Variables 
 
Existing literature documents a causal relationship between inside ownership and firm valuation. 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership structure is endogenous. Kole 
(1996), Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Chang (2003) have shown that 
performance may influence ownership structure, but not vice versa. Accordingly, we include firm 
valuation as a key explanatory variable for family ownership as well as for affiliated-company 




Firm valuation is measured by Tobin’s Q ratio, which is calculated as a market-to-book ratio of assets. 
Market value is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Market 
value of equity is calculated using average share price for the year.
13 We expect firm valuation has a   12
positive effect on family ownership because a family will own more shares in the firm that performs 
well. However, the effect of firm performance on affiliated-company ownership may be different from 
its effect on family ownership. 
 
There may be constraints for the family as well as for the affiliated company about how much they can 
invest in other affiliated companies’ equities. If family ownership is subject to constraints caused by its 
wealth, the constraints will force the family to purchase shares with their personal wealth of only the 
best-performing firms. In such cases, we expect that the firm’s performance would have a positive 
effect on family ownership. 
 
It is often the case that ownership of a company by an affiliated company is for the purpose of 
providing the family with control, not for an intrinsic business purpose. If there were no constraints on 
wealth, the affiliated company would own shares of high-performing firms as well as shares of low-
performing firms, and the effect of firm performance on affiliated-company ownership would be 
ambiguous. Constraints on affiliated-company ownership come either from the limited capital 
available or from regulations that restrict the amount of equity investment in other affiliated 
companies.
14  If such constraints are to be imposed on affiliated-company ownership and if the family 
wants to maintain control of firms that are not performing well, the family will allow affiliated 
companies to own shares of those firms. 
 
Therefore, if constraints on wealth exist, the family will own shares of firms that perform well, and 
affiliate companies will own shares of firms that perform less well and of firms that perform poorly. 
This will result in that firm performance has a positive effect on family ownership, but a negative 
effect on affiliated-company ownership.   
 
Firm size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization.
15 We would expect that family ownership 
would be smaller for a larger firm. As a firm grows and becomes larger, the controlling family may not 
be able to continue to subscribe new equity issues because of the family’s limited personal wealth. In 
such cases, we expect the effect of size on affiliated-company ownership to be positive. When a firm 
issues new equity and the family cannot subscribe because the family cannot afford to, the family may 
let affiliated companies subscribe to maintain the family’s control. 
 
Growth opportunity is measured by the sales growth rate compared with the previous year. We expect 
the family will want to own a firm that has good growth prospects but that it will not necessarily let an   13
affiliated company own such firms. Therefore, we expect that growth opportunity has a positive effect 
on family ownership but not necessarily on affiliated-company ownership. A firm’s risk is measured 
by the beta coefficient of the market model estimated by using the daily stock price and the market 
index for each year. Following Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), we expect a negative 
effect on both family ownership and affiliated-company ownership if both forms of ownership avoid 
shares of riskier companies. The family would avoid owning shares of a riskier firm, but it would 
allow affiliated companies to own shares of risky firms if the family wants to maintain control of the 
firm. Therefore, the firm’s degree of risk may have a positive effect on affiliated-company ownership 
while it has a negative effect on family ownership. 
 
The age of the firm is the number of calendar years since its inception. We expect that ownership will 
become more dispersed as a firm gets older because it might have raised external equity capital as it 
grew over time. Thus, age is expected to have a negative effect on both family ownership and 
affiliated-company ownership. Leverage is measured as the debt-to-equity ratio as of the end of each 
year; leverage captures the financial risk of the firm. The controlling family would avoid owning 
shares of a firm with higher financial risk, and the family would let affiliated companies own such a 
firm if the family has to maintain control of the firm. Thus, leverage is expected to have a negative 
effect on family ownership while it has a positive effect on affiliated-company ownership. However, 
leverage may have negative effects on both family ownership and affiliated-company ownership if 
both avoid owning shares of firms with higher financial risks. 
 
In a pyramidal ownership structure, it is often the case that a firm does not have a business relation 
with the affiliated company whose equity it holds. In other words, equity holdings in affiliated 
companies are not for pure investment or for a business purpose; instead equity holdings provide the 
family its controlling power. Hence, a firm that holds a substantial amount of equities of other 
affiliated companies functions as de facto holding company for the family.
16 
 
The explanatory variable of the equity holdings in affiliated companies are measured as a ratio to the 
total amount of securities assets held by the company. This variable measures how much of the 
company’s security assets are engaged in securing control over other affiliated companies. A pure 
holding company, whose sole business is investing in affiliated companies’ stocks, holds all its 
securities assets as equities of affiliated companies, and the variable is measured as 1. A company that 
does not hold any shares of affiliated companies, and therefore exerts no control over affiliated 
companies, has a variable measured as zero.   14
 
The variable is intended to measure the de facto holding company effect, that is, the higher the equity 
holdings in other affiliated companies, the more the company provides control to the family. Therefore, 
we expect that the variable of the equity holdings in other affiliated companies has a positive effect on 
family ownership.
17 Its effect on affiliated-company ownership, however, depends on constraints on 
the wealth of the affiliated company. 
 
The controlling family needs a certain minimum level of ownership to secure its control over affiliated 
companies. This level of ownership can be obtained by either its own ownership or affiliated-company 
ownership. If there are no financial limits on investment, the affiliated company may invest more in a 
de facto holding company. In such cases, we expect the variable of equity holdings in other affiliated 
companies to have a positive effect on the affiliated-company ownership. If there are constraints on 
investment in both the controlling family and the affiliated company, these two types of ownership 
that provide controlling power for the family will have a substituting effect.
18  In such cases, the effect 
of equity holdings in other affiliated companies on affiliated-company ownership is expected to be 
negative. 
 
We use two alternative measures to check the robustness of the holding company effect. The first 
alternative measure is the natural log of the amount of equity holdings in other affiliated companies 
instead of the ratio to the amount of securities assets. Another alternative measure is the ratio of equity 
holdings in other affiliated companies to the sum of the same variable over all listed affiliated 
companies that are included in our sample. The second alternative would have been better if we could 
have measured it as a ratio to the sum of equity holdings in other affiliated companies for all affiliated 
companies. However, financial data and auditor’s reports for private companies are not publicly 
available. 
 
The variable of bond holdings in other affiliated companies is measured as a ratio to the total amount 
of securities assets. Bond investments in affiliated companies provide capital to the issuing affiliated 
companies, but they do not provide control to a family that invests in bonds. Given that equity and 
debt are substituting capital, the family would own shares of the firm that provides equity capital to 
other affiliated companies because such investment provides control over affiliated companies. If an 
affiliated-company’ bonds could have been sold to investors in a public market, there would be no 
need to have another affiliated companies purchase them. Therefore, holding a substantial amount of 
bonds issued by affiliated companies could be one way of subsidizing the issuing company. The   15
family can have affiliated companies subsidize such a company by forcing them to hold a large 
amount of bonds issued by affiliated companies. If the family chooses this practice, the variable of 
bond holdings in other affiliated companies is expected to have a positive effect on affiliated-company 
ownership but a negative effect on family ownership. 
 
The chaebol group dummy variable is used to identify firms that belong to the group of the top 30 
chaebol. In Korea, the Fair Trade Commission identifies and publishes an annual list of chaebol 
groups and their affiliated companies. These groups are subject to stricter fair trade regulations, 
including regulations on ownership structure, because of their dominance in the market.
19 
 
The new equity issuance dummy variable has the value of 1 for firms that issued new equity during 
the year, and zero otherwise. This is to capture the ownership dilution effect when a firm issues new 
equity. If there are constraints on the family’s personal wealth as the family attempts to subscribe new 
equity, we expect the variable to have a negative effect on family ownership. The same rationale 
applies to affiliated-company ownership. It will, however, have a different effect on affiliated-
company ownership if the family wants to maintain its control and let the affiliated company subscribe 
new equities. In such a case, we expect the variable to have a positive effect on affiliated-company 
ownership. The industry dummy based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
is included in the regression analysis to capture the industry-specific effect on the ownership structure. 
The year dummy is also included in the regression analysis to capture a year-specific effect. 
 
B. Regression Model: Family Ownership and Affiliated-Company Ownership 
 
We carry out separate regression analyses on family ownership and on affiliated-company ownership. 
Although the focus of our paper is to find out what determines family ownership, we also carry out a 
separate regression analysis on affiliated-company ownership in order to capture differences in 
determinants and in their effects on family ownership and affiliated-company ownership.
20 
 
There are four specifications for the family-ownership regression model (Table VI). In specification 
(1), the firm performance variable along with other firm-characteristic variables are included in its 
explanatory variables. In specification (2), two additional explanatory variables are added to 
specification (1). These two variables are equity holdings in other affiliated companies and bond 
holdings in other affiliated companies. The variable of equity holdings in other affiliated companies 
was used to capture the de facto holding company role that a firm may play. The variable of bond   16
holdings in other affiliated companies was used to reflect a substituting effect between equities and 
bonds. In specification (3), the affiliated-company ownership variable is added to specification (1) to 
reflect a substitution effect between family ownership and affiliated-company ownership. In 
specification (4), the affiliated-company ownership variable is added to specification (2).
21 The same 






C. Regression Results 
 
We find that firm performance has a significant positive effect on family ownership, but it has a 
significant negative effect on affiliated-company ownership. The coefficient of the Q ratio for family 
ownership in Table VI is positive and significant at the 1% level in all four specifications. The 
coefficient of the Q ratio for affiliated-company ownership in Table VII is significantly negative in 
three of four specifications. Our results indicate that the family chooses to own more shares of firms 
that perform well while it lets affiliated companies own more shares of firms that do not perform well. 
 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) show that family ownership has a significant and positive 
impact on firm performance, but control minus family ownership, which is equivalent to the affiliated-
company ownership in our analysis, has a significant and negative effect on firm performance. If the 
causality between family ownership and performance runs in both directions, as was confirmed by 
Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), our results are 
consistent with results of both studies. 
 
The effect of equity holdings in other affiliated companies on family ownership is positive and 
significant (Table VI). The company that holds equities of other affiliated companies functions as a de 
facto holding company because it provides the family control over the affiliated companies. Our 
empirical result means that the controlling family owns more shares of the de facto holding company. 
This result confirms that the controlling family is as much interested in its controlling power as it is in 
firm performance. The de facto holding company effect of the equity holdings in other affiliated 
companies is further supported by its opposing effect on affiliated-company ownership. The effect of 
equity holdings in other affiliated companies on affiliated-company ownership is significantly   17
negative (Table VII). This means that the affiliated company owns fewer shares of a firm that 
functions as a de facto holding company. Combining these two opposing effects of equity holdings in 
other affiliated companies, we can conclude that the family, which decides upon the ownership 
structure of companies under its control, chooses to own for itself more shares of the de facto holding 
company and lets the affiliated company own fewer shares. 
 
The significant negative effect of equity holdings in other affiliated companies upon affiliated-
company ownership implies that an affiliated company is constrained by limits on its wealth. Without 
such constraints on the affiliated company, the controlling family would let the affiliated company 
own more shares of the de facto holding company as well as shares of other companies under the 
family’s control. In such a case, the effect of equity holdings in other affiliated companies on the 
affiliated-company ownership would have been neutral. However, the empirical result of a significant 
negative effect implies that the affiliated company is subject to constraints on its wealth so that it 
cannot afford to own shares of all affiliated companies. Therefore, the family on its own chooses to 
own shares of the de facto holding company, and it lets the affiliated company own shares of firms that 
are not functioning as a de facto holding company. 
 
The effect of bond holdings in other affiliated companies on family ownership is negative but 
insignificant (Table VI). However, its effect on affiliated-company ownership is significantly positive 
(Table VII). These results further confirm the de facto holding company effect discussed above. Both 
equity and bond investments in affiliated companies are means of providing capital to affiliated 
companies that issue such securities. Unlike equity, investment in bonds does not provide company 
control. The family, therefore, would avoid or be uninterested in owning shares of a firm that invests 
in other affiliated company’s bonds. The controlling family would rather let the affiliated company 
own shares of firms that invest in other affiliated company’s bonds, and the family would own more 
shares of firms that hold equity of other affiliated companies because equity provides the family with 
control. 
 
Firm size has a negative effect on family ownership, but it has a positive effect on affiliated-company 
ownership. Firm size, however, is significant only in specification (2) of Table VI and Table VII. 
Results indicate that the controlling family marginally loses its ownership as the firm grows over time. 
Even if firm size is marginally significant only in specification (2), its opposing effects between family 
ownership and affiliated-company ownership indicate that the family lets the affiliated company   18
provide additional equity capital when the company issues new equity and when the family is not able 
to subscribe new equity out of its personal wealth. 
 
The coefficient of the age variable is insignificant in all four specifications of the family-ownership 
regression. It is significantly negative, however, in all four specifications of the affiliated-company-
ownership regression. This result implies that the controlling family maintains its ownership of both 
young and old companies. The affiliated company, however, owns fewer shares of old companies and 
more shares of young companies. In a pyramidal structure such as shown in Figure 1, older firms tend 
to be positioned close to the pinnacle of the pyramid, and the family would own more shares of such 
firms rather than allow affiliated companies to own such shares. Younger firms are positioned in the 
middle or lower ranks of the pyramid, and those new firms are established with capital provided by 
affiliated companies rather than by the family. The negative age effect on affiliated-company 
ownership may reflect the age characteristics of firms in a pyramidal structure. 
 
Leverage has a significant and negative effect on family ownership (Table VI), but it has a significant 
and positive effect on affiliated-company ownership (Table VII). High leverage means high financial 
risks, and the controlling family avoids owning shares of firms with high financial risks. Instead, the 
family lets affiliated companies own shares of firms with high financial risks. The beta coefficient, 
which measures systematic risk, has significant and negative effects on both family ownership and 
affiliated-company ownership. Because systematic risk is not under the control of management, both 
the family and the affiliated company prefer to avoid owning firms that have high systematic risk. 
 
The chaebol group dummy has a significantly negative coefficient in the family-ownership regressions 
while it has a significantly positive coefficient in the affiliated-company-ownership regressions; this 
means that the controlling family of a chaebol group owns fewer shares than the controlling family of 
a non-chaebol group of companies. On the other hand, a company that is part of a chaebol owns more 
shares of affiliated companies than does the company that is not a member of a chaebol. In other 
words, a company that belongs to a chaebol has a lower level of family ownership but it has a higher 
level of affiliated-company ownership. This may reflect the fact that a chaebol family tends to secure 
its control through affiliated-company ownership rather than through its own ownership. This result 
implies that there is a higher risk of agency problem with chaebol group affiliated companies and it 
may justify regulations that limit an amount of equity investments a company can make into other 
affiliated companies.   
   19
The equity issuance dummy has a significantly negative effect on family ownership in all four 
specifications. It also has a negative effect on affiliated-company ownership, but the negative effect is 
significant only in specifications (3) and (4). This result indicates that both the family and the 
affiliated company lose some of their ownership share when the firm issues new equity, and it implies 
that the family is constrained by the fact that its wealth is limited. No regulation in Korea limits family 
ownership; the family loses a portion of its ownership because it does not possess unlimited funds to 
purchase newly issued equity. It is unclear, however, whether affiliated companies lose some portion 
of their ownership because their funds to invest are limited or because of government restrictions that 
limit the amount they can invest in affiliated companies. 
 
Four types of ownership provide the family its voting rights—in other words, its power to control: 
family ownership; affiliated-company ownership; affiliated-foundation ownership; and nonfamily 
management ownership. In family-controlled firms, it is the controlling family that decides which type 
of ownership it wants to use to secure its controlling power. As presented in Table III, family 
ownership and affiliated-company ownership are the most frequently used means of securing a control. 
These two types of ownership together account for 96.5% of voting rights. 
 
We add affiliated-company ownership to the list of explanatory variables for the family-ownership 
regression in order to find out whether the de facto holding company effect persists even when a 
substituting effect between these two types of ownership is incorporated into regression analysis. In 
specifications (3) and (4) of the family-ownership regression, the coefficient of affiliated-company 
ownership is negative and it is significant at the 1% level. In the affiliated-company-ownership 
regression, we find similar significant negative coefficients for family ownership that is employed as 
an explanatory variable in specifications (3) and (4). Regression results show that there exists a 
substitution effect between family ownership and affiliated-company ownership. Results also show 
that the de facto holding company effect remains the same even when such substituting effects are 
taken into account. 
 
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. The controlling family owns more shares of firms 
that perform better. The family also owns more shares of de facto holding companies that provide the 
family with control over affiliated companies. The family allows affiliated companies to own more 
shares of firms that perform poorly and fewer shares of de facto holding companies. The controlling 
family also allows affiliated companies to own more shares of firms that provide debt capital to other 
affiliated companies. The significant positive effect of the firm’s performance on family ownership   20
and the significant negative effect on affiliated-company ownership are consistent with findings 
presented in existing literature. Our analysis shows, however, that it is not only a firm’s performance 
but also a firm’s ability to provide control over affiliated companies that are key determinants of the 
family ownership structure. 
 
D. Robustness Test of the De Facto Holding Company Effect 
 
The explanatory variable of equity holdings in other affiliated companies is used to capture how much 
the company engages in providing the ownership family its controlling power. The larger the value of 
this variable, the more the company functions as a de facto holding company. In our regression 
analysis whose results are presented in the previous section, the variable is measured as a ratio to the 
total amount of securities assets held by the company. For two companies that hold the same amount 
of equities in affiliated companies, our measure is smaller for the company that holds larger amounts 
of securities assets. Therefore, our study may understate the de facto holding company effect for a 
company that holds a large amount of securities assets. We employ two other alternative measures to 
find out whether the de facto holding company effect is sensitive to how the variable is defined. 
 
The first alternative measure is a natural log of the amount of equity holdings in other affiliated 
companies. The second alternative measure is a ratio of equity holdings in affiliated companies to a 
sum of the same variable for all listed affiliated companies that are under the control of the same 
family. 
 
The second alternative measure captures the relative importance of the company among listed 
affiliated companies concerning how much controlling power the company provides the family. It 
would have been better if we could have computed the second alternative measure as a ratio to the 
sum for all affiliated companies under control of the same family, but financial data for unlisted 
companies are not available. Therefore, our second alternative is measured as a ratio to the sum only 
for those that are listed and included in our sample. For a company not listing all of its affiliated 
companies, we could not compute the second alternative measure; therefore, those companies are 
excluded from the regression analysis using the second alternative measure. We also exclude 
companies that have only one listed affiliated company. For such a company, we cannot compute a 
relative ratio to the sum.
22  These limitations reduce to 729 the number in the sample for the regression 
analysis employing the second alternative measure. 
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Table VIII presents the results of regression analyses that employ two alternative measures of the 
equity holdings in other affiliated companies. The bond holdings in other affiliated companies are also 
measured by the same two alternatives. Panel (A) in Table VIII presents regression results employing 
the equity holdings in other affiliated companies that are measured by a natural log of the amount. 
Panel (B) in Table VIII presents regression results employing the equity holdings in other affiliated 




For both alternative measures of the equity holdings in other affiliated companies, the de facto holding 
company effect remains the same; this finding also holds true for other explanatory variables, 
including firm performance. This is true for both regressions—for family ownership and for affiliated-
company ownership. The significance level of the de facto holding company effect increases further 
when the second alternative measure for equity holdings in other affiliated companies is employed. 
Therefore, we can reaffirm our findings of that it is not only a firm’s performance but also a firm’s 
ability to provide control over affiliated companies that are key determinants of the family ownership. 
 
E. Logit Regression on Family Ownership 
 
Our sample includes 172 firms whose shares the controlling family does not own at all. This accounts 
for 11.2% of all firms in our sample. These 172 firms constitute a distinctive sample to reaffirm the de 
facto holding company effect because the family maintains its control over them entirely through 
affiliated-companies ownership. If the family values its power to control as much as it values the 
firm’s performance, we should be able to observe that both the performance of the firm and the equity 
holdings in affiliated companies are substantially smaller for these 172 firms than for other remaining 
firms whose shares the family owns. 
 
Table IX compares the differences in firm performance and equity holdings in other affiliated 
companies between firms that operate with and without family ownership. We find no significant 
difference in the Q ratio between these two sets of firms. This result is not consistent with what we 
expect—that is, that the controlling family would own more shares of firms that perform well. This 
result raises the question of why the family does not own shares of these firms even though their 
performance is no worse than the performance of others. We can find part of the answer to this   22
question from the variable that represents how much control the company provides the family, that is, 




The variable of equity holdings in other affiliated companies is significantly smaller for firms without 
family ownership. This is true for both the mean and the median of all three alternative measures of 
the variable except for the median of log value. These results may imply that the family values its 
control more than it values the firm’s performance; therefore, it does not own shares of firms that do 
not hold equities of other affiliated companies regardless of firm performance. 
 
We carry out a logit regression analysis to confirm this conjecture; Table X presents the logit 
regression results. In this logit regression, the dependent variable is a family-ownership indicator. The 
value of the dependent variable is zero for firms whose shares the family does not own at all. It is 1 for 




In Table X, the coefficient of the Q ratio is negative for all four specifications, but it is insignificant 
except in specification (3). The coefficient of equity holdings in other affiliated companies is 
significant, however, in both regressions that include this variable in the specification. In ordinary 
least squares regressions whose results are presented in Table VI, both firm performance and equity 
holdings in other affiliated companies have significantly positive effects on family ownership. In logit 
regressions, however, only equity holdings in other affiliated companies has a significantly positive 
effect on family ownership; firm performance has either an insignificant or a significantly negative 
effect on family ownership. 
 
This result implies that the family prefers to control a firm rather than consider firm performance 
when it makes a decision whether to own or not to own. The controlling family chooses not to own 
shares if the firm does not provide the family with control over other affiliated companies even if the 
firm performs well. It also means that the family chooses to own shares of a firm that provides control 
even when the firm does not perform well. This result may reflect the fact that there are constraints on 
the amount a family can invest. If the family’s personal wealth is sufficiently large, it would prefer to   23
own shares of all firms in which it could maintain control. If its wealth is limited, however, the family 
prefers to own shares that provide control rather than high performance. 
 
This de facto holding company effect is further supported by the effect on family ownership of bond 
holdings in other affiliated companies. In Table IX, there are no significant differences among the 
three alternative measures of the bond holdings in other affiliated companies between firms without 
family ownership and firms with family ownership. In logit regression, coefficients of bond holdings 
in other affiliated companies are negative, and it is significant in specification (2). Both equity and 
bond holdings in affiliated companies could be a form of providing financial subsidies to affiliated 
companies. Unlike equity, however, holding bonds does not provide control. Controlling families, 
therefore, avoid owning shares of firms that do not hold equity in other affiliated companies as well as 
firms that hold bonds in affiliated companies. 
 
IV. Widely Held Firms versus Closely Held Firms 
 
There may be differences in ownership determinants between widely held firms and closely held firms. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), and Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) analyze ownership structures for closely held firms and widely held 
firms in many countries. In particular, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) compare control of 
corporation by owner type for eight East Asian countries. They define the closely held firms with both 
a 10% and a 20% cutoff point of family ownership and report that 14.3% of their Korean sample is 
widely held when a 10% cutoff is applied and 43.2% of the sample is widely held when a 20% cutoff 
is applied. 
 
Our sample is a bit different from the one used by Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002). We 
focus only on family firms, and we excluded from our sample firms with no controlling family. Only 
3.7% of our sample of Korean firms, as presented in Table IV, could be classified as widely held firms 
if a 10% cutoff is applied. We apply a 20% cutoff for classifying closely held firms and widely held 
firms. If the owner’s share of the corporate vote is equal to or greater than 20%, we classify the firm as 
a closely held firm. When we apply the 20% cutoff rule, 243 firms (15.8%) out of 1,538 sample firms 
are classified as widely held firms. We also use a 30% cutoff alternatively. When we apply the 30% 
cutoff rule, 642 firms (41.8%) out of 1,538 sample firms are classified as widely held firms. 
Regression results for the closely held firms and for the widely held firms are summarized in Table XI 






There are distinctive differences between closely held firms and widely held firms in regression results. 
The first noticeable difference is the effect of the firm’s performance on family ownership. In Table XI, 
the effect of firm performance on family ownership is much stronger in closely held firms than in 
widely held firms. The coefficient of firm performance for closely held firms is three times larger than 
that for widely held firms, and its significance level is also higher than that for widely held firms. This 
is true for regressions using 20% and 30% cutoffs. In Table XII, the negative effect of firm 
performance on affiliated-company ownership is also stronger and more significant for closely held 
firms. The coefficient of firm performance on affiliated-company ownership is significantly negative 
for closely held firms at 1% level of significance. For widely held firms, it is significant when the 30% 
cutoff is applied, but it is insignificant when the 20% cutoff is applied. The coefficient for closely held 
firms is much larger in absolute size than that for widely held firms. This result implies that the 
controlling family is more sensitive to the firm’s performance when the family’s controlling power is 
more tightly secured. In other words, the family owns more shares of high-performing, closely held 
firms in its own account instead of allowing affiliated companies own large numbers of shares. 
 
Another noticeable difference between closely held firms and widely held firms is that the de facto 
holding company effect is much stronger for closely held firms. The coefficients of the equity holdings 
in other affiliated companies are positive and significant at 1% level for closely held firms (Table XI), 
but they are insignificant or marginally significant for widely held firms. For widely held firms, it is 
positive but insignificant in regression using the 20% cutoff, and it is positive and significant at the 
10% level in regression using the 30% cutoff. The size of the coefficient of equity holdings in 
affiliated companies is twice as large for closely held firms as it is for widely held firms. The de facto 
holding company effect is further supported by regressions on affiliated-company ownership (Table 
XII). Equity holdings in other affiliated companies has a larger and more significant negative effect on 
affiliated-company ownership for closely held firms than for widely held firms, which means that the 
de facto holding company effect (i.e., the controlling family owns more shares of a company that 
provides it a controlling power) is much more evident when the company is closely held.
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VI. Conclusion 
 
We carry out analysis on what determines the ownership structure of family firms in Korea. Family 
ownership and affiliated-company ownership are two major means of securing a controlling power 
over affiliated companies under family control. We analyze what determines each of these two types 
of ownership and find out whether there are any differences in their determinants. Our analysis shows 
that the controlling family owns more shares of firms that perform better. The family also owns more 
shares of de facto holding companies that provide the family control over other affiliated companies. 
The family, however, allows affiliated companies to own more shares of firms that are performing less 
well and of firms that do not provide the family with control over the company. Therefore, both 
control on affiliated companies and performance of the firm have opposite effects on family ownership 
and on affiliated-company ownership. 
 
Our paper confirms that the family evaluates its control as well as the performance of the firm when it 
decides on the ownership structure for firms under its control. Given that existing literature confirms 
the existence of a bilateral causality between the ownership of the firm and the value of a firm, our 
result of a significant positive effect of firm performance on family ownership is consistent with 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), who show that the value of a firm increases with an 
increasing ownership share for the controlling shareholders. 
 
We, however, showed that the power to control is as important a factor as the firm’s performance when 
it comes to determining family ownership. We find that the de facto holding company effect is robust 
for different ways of measuring the power to control other affiliated companies. The importance of 
having controlling power is further supported by the effect that bond holdings in affiliated companies 
have on family ownership. Both equities and bonds are means of providing capital to affiliated 
companies. Unlike equities, however, holding bonds does not provide control over a company. We find 
that families own more shares of firms that make equity investments in affiliated companies, but they 
own fewer shares of firms that make bond investments in affiliated companies. 
 
We further carry out logit regressions for firms without any family ownership and firms with a 
positive family ownership. Our results show that the power to control is more important than the 
performance of the firm when the family makes a decision whether to own or not own shares of a 
certain firm. In other words, regardless of a firm’s performance, the family rejects owning its shares if   26
the firm does not provide a significant controlling power over other affiliated companies. We also 
show that the family values its controlling power more for closely held firms. 
 
Our empirical finding that the family prefers more shares of a de facto holding company that provides 
control has not been documented in existing studies. It is this paper’s contribution to the literature of 
ownership structure. Our analysis, however, has shortcomings. In particular, it does not address the 
issue of endogeneity of firm performance and controlling power in determining family ownership. 
Although we do not report the results in this paper, we ran two-stage least squares regressions to 
incorporate the endogeneity of firm performance, and we find that our empirical findings remain the 
same. This result is insufficient, however, because not only the firm’s performance but also controlling 
power might be determined endogenously. Any shortcomings of endogeneity in our analysiss can be 
partially mitigated by the fact that our analysis is for the 1998–2001 period, that is, after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. During this period, there were many corporate restructuring efforts, including 
changes of ownership structure. Families had an opportunity to change the structure of their corporate 
ownership during this period, and families chose to own shares of better-performing firms. In this case, 
causality runs from firm performance to family ownership. However, not enough time has passed 
since ownership structures changed to have causality run from ownership to firm performance. This 
should also be true for causality between controlling power and family ownership. The family chooses 
to own shares of firms that provide control so that causality runs from control to family ownership, not 
vice versa.   27
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Notes 
                                                 
1  Claessens, et al. (2002) apply a definition of a widely held corporation as one that does not 
have any owner with 10 percent or more of control rights. 
2  In 2001, 624 nonfinancial firms were listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. We excluded 158 
firms that had negative equity book values and that were missing financial data. This left us 466 
sample firms. Out of 466 sample firms for an analysis, only 50 firms—mostly firms in the 
process of restructuring under a creditor bank’s control or under court receivership—did not 
have a controlling family. 
3  Ownership figures cited are as of April 1, 2004. 
4  Companies that anchor each of the three pyramidal ownership structures of Samsung 
Electronics are Samsung Life Insurance, Samsung Corporation, and Samsung Fire and Marine 
Insurance.   
5  Ownership at the level of 15.58% may not be sufficient to secure management control if there 
is a well-developed market for corporate control. Given that hostile takeover in Korea is 
extremely rare and that Samsung Electronics has the largest market capitalization, a 15% 
ownership provides a fairly secure level of management control. 
6  No holding companies were established before 2001 in Korea, where holding companies were 
not allowed by law until 1999. Among the top 10 chaebol, only the LG group has undergone 
ownership restructuring to transform it into a holding company structure. LG group’s 
restructuring into holding company structure were completed in part in 2003. 
7  A pure holding company does not engage in any business other than holding shares of other 
companies for the purpose of controlling those companies. The company that operates its own 
business as well as holds shares of other companies for the purpose of controlling them is   33
                                                                                                                                                             
effectively functioning as a de facto holding company. Only pure holding companies are legal in 
Korea, but there are many de facto holding companies even if they are not called holding 
companies. 
8  One illustrative example is Samsung Everland, which is in the amusement park business as 
well as the real estate management business. Samsung Everland owns a substantial share of 
Samsung Life Insurance, Samsung Heavy Industry (ship building), and Samsung Techwin 
(precision machinery). Samsung Everland, however, does not have any obvious business 
relationship with these companies. The controlling Lee family owns 54.4% of Samsung Everland 
while it owns 9.22% and 0.09% of Samsung Life Insurance and Samsung Heavy Industry, 
respectively. They, however, do not own any shares in Samsung Techwin. 
9  The Korean regulation that imposed a 25% ceiling on the amount of equity investment that can 
be invested in affiliated companies’ equity was removed in 1998 as part of the effort to expedite 
restructuring; however, the regulation was reinstated in 2001. During the 1998–2001 period, 
ownership structure in Korea changed a great deal. 
10  The accuracy of the ownership data is rechecked with the use of another set of databases, TS-
2000, provided by the Korea Listed Company Association. There are some discrepancies 
between the two data sets, even if such cases are minor. Such discrepancies include cases of 
missing affiliated companies’ ownership as well as cases of firms whose controlling shareholder 
changed from the family to financial institutions or to government because of a workout 
restructuring program or a court receivership. 
11  The correlation coefficient matrix is presented in Table XIII.   34
                                                                                                                                                             
12 Korea’s  Fair  Trade  Act  prohibits cross-holding between affiliated companies. It also imposes a 
ceiling on the amount of equity investment that can be invested in other affiliated companies’ 
equity. The ceiling is 25% of net asset value. This ceiling was removed in 1998 to help with the 
restructuring of troubled companies after the 1997 financial crisis, but it was reinstated in 2001. 
13  We also use share price as of the end of each year, and we find our empirical results remain 
the same. 
14  Regulations on ownership imposed by Korea’s Fair Trade Act are discussed in note 11. 
15  Alternatively, the book value of assets and the book value of equity was used; the results 
remain the same. 
16  See the discussion accompanying Figure 1 at the beginning of this article. 
17  In Korea, no holding companies were established during the sample period of our study. 
Therefore, a company that holds equities of other affiliated companies functions as an operating 
holding company, which is a de facto holding company for the controlling family. 
18  The negative correlation between family ownership and affiliated company ownership implies 
that such constraints on wealth exist. 
19  For companies that belong chaebol and whose asset size is greater than 5 trillion Korean won 
($4.5 billion), the Korean Fair Trade Act applies a cap on the amount of equity investment 
permitted in other affiliated companies. The cap is 25% of net asset value. This regulation was 
discontinued in 1998 but was reinstated in 2001. These chaebol are also subject to a regulation 
that limits the amount of the debt guarantee to affiliated companies.   35
                                                                                                                                                             
20  As presented in Table III, family ownership and affiliated company ownership are two major 
means of securing corporate voting rights. These two types of ownership together account for 
96.5% of voting rights. 
21  To avoid potential complications resulting from the causality between firm ownership and 
firm performance, we also carried out two-stage least squares regression for firm value; we find 
that causality runs both ways, and the effect of equity holdings on other affiliated companies 
remains robust. Therefore, we do not report the details in this paper. 
22  For a company with only one listed affiliated company, the second alternative measure is 
computed as 1 by design. 
23  We applied a much higher cutoff—40% and 50% alternatively—and we confirmed the 
stronger effect of firm performance on family ownership and the stronger holding company 
effect found for closely held firms. 








Samples are nonfinancial publicly traded firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. Firms whose equity book value 
is negative, firms whose fiscal year does not end at the end of December, firms with missing financial data, firms 
with no controlling family, and firms that do not have any affiliated companies are excluded from the sample. With 
the use of the above stated five selection criteria, 1,003 firms are excluded from the sample out of 2,541 
nonfinancial listed firms for the period of 1998–2001. The number of samples for the analysis is 1,538. 
 
Years 
Sample Selection Criteria  1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Number of nonfinancial listed firms  654  635  628  624  2,541 
Number of firms with negative equity book value 98  90  83  54  325 
Number of firms with non-December fiscal year  74  64  48  52  238 
Number of firms with missing financial data  41  27  25  52  145 
Number firms remaining after selecting out firms that 
fall into the above three categories 
441 454 472 466  1,833 
Number of firms with no controlling family  17  24  39  50  130 
Number of firms with no affiliated companies  42  42  39  42  165 
Number of firms remaining, i.e., family firms with 
affiliated companies 
382 388 394 374  1,538 






Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Structure of Family Firms in Korea, 1998–2001 
 
Samples are family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies. Family ownership is a proportion of shares 
owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s family; it is same as the controlling family’s 
cashflow right. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares owned by affiliated companies under the 
control of the controlling family. Affiliated-foundation ownership is a proportion of shares owned by a cultural or 
charitable foundation under the control of the controlling family. Nonfamily management ownership is a proportion 
of shares owned by the management of the firm that is not a member of the controlling family. Inside ownership is 
the sum of above stated four types of ownership, and it is the controlling family’s voting right. The number of 













Family ownership  20.7  20.5  15.5  0.0  76.3 
Affiliated-company ownership  12.6  4.4  16.7  0.0  97.6 
Affiliated-foundation  ownership  0.7 0.0 2.3 0.0  28.0 
Nonfamily-management  ownership  1.1 0.1 2.7 0.0  23.5 
Inside ownership  35.2  35.0  15.5  0.6  97.6 






Ownership Structure of Korean Companies, 1998–2001 
 
Family ownership is a proportion of shares owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s 
family; it is the controlling family’s cashflow right. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares owned 
by affiliated companies under the control of the controlling family. Inside ownership is the sum of family ownership, 
affiliated-company ownership, affiliated-foundation ownership, and nonfamily-management ownership. It is the 









(%)  Number in Sample 
1998 20.8  12.8  34.9  382 
1999 19.3  12.9  33.4  388 
2000 20.9  13.9  35.8  394 
2001 21.9  13.9  36.7  374 
Average, all years  20.7  13.3  35.2  1,538 






Distribution of Family Ownership and Affiliated-Company Ownership 
 
Samples are family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies. Family ownership is a proportion of shares 
owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s family; it is the same as the controlling 
family’s cashflow right. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares owned by affiliated companies 
under the control of the controlling family. Inside ownership is the sum of family ownership, affiliated-company 
ownership, affiliated-foundation ownership, and nonfamily-management ownership. It is the controlling family’s 
voting right. The total number of samples for the 1998–2001 sample period is 1,538. 
 
Family Ownership  Affiliated-Company 
Ownership  Inside Ownership  Range Of 
Ownership 
(%)  Frequency  Proportion 
(%)  Frequency  Proportion 
(%)  Frequency  Proportion 
(%) 
0–10 470  30.6  906  58.9  57  3.7 
10–20  279 18.1  180 11.7 186 12.1 
20–30  369 24.0  209 13.6 399 25.9 
30–40  221 14.4  100  6.5 331 21.5 
40–50  150 9.8  80 5.2  327  21.3 
50–60  38 2.5  33 2.1  136 8.8 
60–70  8 0.5  20 1.3 65 4.2 
70–80  3 0.2  6 0.4 29 1.9 
80–90  0 0.0  2 0.1  5 0.3 
90–100  0 0.0  2 0.1  3 0.2 
Sum  1,538 100.0 1,538 100.0 1,538 100.0 






Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
 
Firm valuation is measure by Tobin’s Q ratio that is calculated as a market-to-book ratio of assets. Market value is 
defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt. Firm size is the natural log of market 
capitalization. Age is number of calendar years since firm’s inception. Leverage is measured as debt-to-equity ratio 
as of the end of each year. Sales growth is the growth rate from the previous year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the 
market model estimated using the daily stock price and market index for each year. Equity holdings in other 
affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bonding holdings in other affiliated companies is also a ratio to 
securities assets. The number of affiliated companies is the number of firms that are under the control of the same 
controlling family. Chaebol group dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to the group of top 30 chaebol; it is zero 
otherwise. New equity issuance dummy variable is 1 for a firm that issued new equity in the year; it is zero 
otherwise. 
 
Explanatory Variable  Mean  Median  S.D.  Minimum  Maximum
Q ratio using year-end share price  1.198  1.086  0.443  0.428  6.864 
Q ratio using annual average share price  1.187  1.078  0.441  0.163  6.551 
Size 31.529  31.316  1.486  27.655  38.290 
Age  31.979 30.092 11.715  1.013 82.023 
Leverage  (debt/equity)  3.572 1.288  22.623 0.046  740.733 
Sales  growth  0.122 0.068 0.592  -0.912  13.066 
Beta  0.721 0.711 0.260  -0.176 2.043 
Affiliated  companies’  stock  0.380 0.368 0.277 0.000 0.985 
Affiliated  companies’  bonds  0.004 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.602 
Number of affiliated companies  12.612  6.000  15.016  1.000  63.000 
Chaebol  dummy  0.272 0.000 0.445 0.000 1.000 
Equity  issuance  dummy  0.363 0.000 0.481 0.000 1.000 
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Table VI 
Regression Results for Family Ownership 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1998–2001. Only 
family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies are included in the analysis. Family ownership is a proportion 
of shares owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s family. Q ratio is calculated as a 
market-to-book ratio of assets. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares owned by affiliated 
companies under the control of the controlling family. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization. Age is 
the number of calendar years since firm’s inception. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is the growth rate 
from the previous year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the market model estimated using the daily stock price and 
market index for each year. Equity holdings in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bond 
holdings in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Chaebol group dummy variable is 1 if the firm 
belongs to the group of top 30 chaebol; it is zero otherwise. New equity issuance dummy variable is 1 for firms that 
issued new equity in the year; it is zero otherwise. Industry dummy and year dummy are included in the regression, 
but their results are not reported in the table. a, significant at 1% level; b, significant at 5% level; c, significant at 
10% level. 
 
Dependent Variable  Family Ownership 























































































Industry dummy  included included included  included
Year dummy  included included included  included
Adj. R squared  0.3189 0.3233 0.4819  0.4823
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Table VII 
Regression Results for Affiliated-Company Ownership 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1998–2001. Only 
family-controlled firms that have affiliated-companies are included in the analysis. Affiliated-company ownership is 
a proportion of shares owned by affiliated companies under the control of the controlling family. Family ownership 
is a proportion of shares owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s family. Q ratio is 
calculated as a market-to-book ratio of assets. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization. Age is the 
number of calendar years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is the growth rate 
from the previous year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the market model estimated using the daily stock price and 
market index for each year. Equity holdings in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bond 
holdings in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Chaebol group dummy variable is 1 if the firm 
belongs to the group of top 30 chaebol; it is zero otherwise. New equity issuance dummy variable is 1 for firms that 
issued new equity in the year; it is zero otherwise. Industry dummy and year dummy are included in the regression, 
but their results are not reported in the table. a, significant at 1% level; b, significant at 5% level; c, significant at 
10% level. 
 
Dependent Variable  Affiliated-Company Ownership 





















































































Industry  dummy  included included included included 
Year  dummy  included included included included 
Adj. R  squared  0.2156 0.2230 0.4055 0.4033 
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Table VIII 
Robustness Test on the De Facto Holding Company Effect 
 
The table summarizes regression results employing two alternative measures of the explanatory variable of equity 
holdings in other affiliated companies (EH). The first alternative is a natural log of the amount of equity holdings in 
other affiliated companies. The second alternative is a ratio of the amount of equity holdings in other affiliated 
companies to the sum for all listed affiliated companies that are included in our sample. Bond holdings in other 
affiliated companies (BH) is measured in the same manner as EH. Specification (A) employs the first alternative 
measure, and specification (B) employs the second alternative. There are firms whose affiliated companies are not 
included in our sample because they are not listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. We cannot compute the total 
amount of equity and bond holdings in other affiliated companies held by all affiliated companies because financial 
data for unlisted companies are not available. There are firms excluded from the analysis of specification (B) either 
because all of affiliated companies not listed or because there is only one listed affiliated company; therefore the 
number of samples for specification (B) is smaller than for specification (A). 
 
(A) (B) 






































































EH/sum of EH of 










BH/sum of BH of 


























Industry dummy  included  included  included  included  included 
Year dummy  included  included  included  included  included 
Adj. R squared  0.3242  0.2308  Adj. R squared  0.3681  0.2932 
Number of samples  1,538  1,538  Number of samples  729  729 




Differences between Firms without Family Ownership versus Firms with Family Ownership 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1998–2001. Only 
family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies are included in the sample. There are 172 firms whose shares 
the controlling family does not own at all; these firms comprise 11.2% of all sample firms. For these firms, the 
family’s controlling power is secured entirely through affiliated-company ownership. Q ratio is calculated as a 
market-to-book ratio of assets. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization. Equity holdings in other 
affiliated companies (EH) is measured by three alternatives: the first is a ratio to securities assets; the second is the 
natural log of the amount of equity holdings in other affiliated companies; the third is a ratio to the sum of EH of all 
listed companies. Bond holdings in other affiliated companies are also measure by the same three alternative 
methods. There are firms whose affiliated companies are not included in our sample because they are not listed on 
the Korea Stock Exchange. We cannot compute the total amount of equity and bond holdings in other affiliated 
companies held by all affiliated companies because financial data for unlisted companies are not available. Certain 
firms are excluded from the analysis; therefore the number of samples for the third alternative is smaller than for the 
two other measures. 
 
Firms without Family 









Mean Median t-test  Wilcoxon 
z-test 
Panel A: Firm Performance 
Q  ratio  172 1.228 1.057 1,366 1.194 1.088  0.398  0.106 
Panel B: Equity Holdings (EH) in Other Affiliated Companies 
EH/securities  assets  172 0.319 0.268 1,366 0.387 0.377  0.002  0.024 
ln  (EH)  172 13.203 16.302  1,366 15.003 16.058 0.002  0.419 
EH/sum of EH of all 
listed affiliated 
companies* 
153 0.055 0.010  576 0.374 0.293  0.000  0.000 
Panel C: Bond Holdings (BH) in Other Affiliated Companies 
BH/securities  assets  172 0.014 0.000 1,366 0.003 0.000  0.037  0.321 
ln  (BH)  172 0.953 0.000 1,366 0.679 0.000  0.375  0.321 
BH/sum of BH of all 
listed affiliated 
companies* 
153 0.044 0.000  576 0.060 0.000  0.383  0.506 
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Table X 
Logit Regression Results for Family Ownership 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1998–2001. Only 
family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies are included in the sample. There are 172 firms whose shares 
the controlling family does not own at all; they comprise 11.2% of all sample firms. For these firms, the family’s 
controlling power is secured entirely through affiliated-company ownership. The dependent variable takes a value of 
1 it the family ownership is positive; otherwise, the dependent variable takes a value of zero. Q ratio is calculated as 
a market-to-book ratio of assets. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization. Age is the number of calendar 
years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is the growth rate from the previous 
year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the market model estimated using the daily stock price and market index for each 
year. Equity holdings in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bond holdings in other affiliated 
companies is a ratio to securities assets. The chaebol group dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to the group of 
the top 30 chaebol; it is zero otherwise. New equity issuance dummy variable is 1 for firms that issued new equity in 
the year; it is zero otherwise. Industry dummy and year dummy are included in the regression, but their results are 
not reported in the table. The number in parentheses is the z-value. a, significant at 1% level; b, significant at 5% 
level. c, significant at 10% level. 
 
Dependent Variable  Family Ownership Indicator 
If family ownership >0, then it is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. 





















































































Industry dummy  included  included  included  included 
Year dummy  included  included  included  included 
Pseudo R squared  0.2636  0.2796  0.3758  0.3825 
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Table XI 
Regression Results for Family Ownership: Closely Held Firms versus Widely Held Firms 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1998–2001. Only 
family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies are included in the sample. Family ownership is a proportion 
of shares owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s family. Closely held firms are 
companies whose control rights exceed 20%. When the 20% cutoff is applied, 1,295 are classified as closely held 
firms and 243 firms are classified as widely held firms. Family ownership is a proportion of shares owned by the 
controlling family. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares owned by affiliated companies. Q ratio is 
calculated as a market-to-book ratio of assets. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization. Age is the 
number of calendar years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is a growth rate 
from the previous year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the market model estimated using daily stock price and market 
index for each year. Equity holding in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bond holding in other 
affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Chaebol group dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to the 
group of top 30 chaebol; it is zero otherwise. New equity issuance dummy variable is 1 for firms that issued new 
equity in the year; it is zero otherwise. Industry dummy and year dummy are included in the regression, but their 
results are not reported in the table. a, significant at 1% level; b, significant at 5% level; c, significant at 10% level. 
 
Family Ownership 






































































































Industry dummy  included included included  included
Year dummy  included included included  included
Adj. R squared  0.3028 0.2658 0.2868  0.3959
Number in sample  243 1,295 642  896
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Table XII 
Regression Results for Affiliated-Company Ownership: Closely Held Firms versus Widely Held Firms 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period 1998–2001. Only 
family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies are included in the sample. Family ownership is a proportion 
of shares owned by the controlling shareholder and the controlling shareholder’s family. Closely held firms are 
companies whose control rights exceed 20%. When the 20% cutoff is applied, 1,295 are classified as closely held 
firms and 243 firms are classified as widely held firms. Family ownership is a proportion of shares owned by the 
controlling family. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares owned by affiliated companies. Q ratio is 
calculated as a market-to-book ratio of assets. Firm size is the natural log of market capitalization. Age is the 
number of calendar years since the firm’s inception. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is a growth rate 
from the previous year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the market model estimated using daily stock price and market 
index for each year. Equity holding in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bond holding in other 
affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Chaebol group dummy variable is 1 if the firm belongs to the 
group of top 30 chaebol; it is zero otherwise. New equity issuance dummy variable is 1 for firms that issued new 
equity in the year; it is zero otherwise. Industry dummy and year dummy are included in the regression, but their 
results are not reported in the table. a, significant at 1% level; b, significant at 5% level; c, significant at 10% level. 
 
Affiliated-Company Ownership 






































































































Industry dummy  included included included  included
Year dummy  included included included  included
Adj. R squared  0.2715 0.3919 0.3148  0.3545




 Table XIII 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Samples are publicly traded corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange for the 1998–2001. Only family-controlled firms that have affiliated companies are 
included in the analysis. Family ownership is a proportion of shares owned by the controlling family. Affiliated-company ownership is a proportion of shares 
owned by affiliated companies under the control of the family. Q ratio is calculated as a market-to-book ratio of assets. Firm size is the natural log of market 
capitalization. Age is number of calendar years since firm's inception. Leverage is debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is the growth rate compared with the 
previous year. Beta is the beta coefficient of the market model estimated using the daily stock price and market index for each year. Equity holdings in other 
affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Bond holdings in other affiliated companies is a ratio to securities assets. Number in the first row for each 
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Figure 1 
 
 